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NOTES
RIGHT TO FREE TRANSCRIPT
A transcript of a trial is a verbatim record of the official proceedings. Under
the requirements of statutes, constitutional provisions, or court policy, a crim-
inally-convicted defendant may be entitled to a free transcript. A determination
of the existence of such a right entails consideration of defendant's financial
condition and the nature of his crime; whereas, the extent of the right may often
be entirely determined by state and county policies.
Need for Transcript
A transcript is a highly desirable asset to the criminal defendant seeking
appellate review of his conviction. Initially, counsel would find it useful for
identifying and accurately describing what he alleges to be judicial error. If
counsel first entered the case at the appellate level, he may be totally unable
"to discover any error without the aid of a transcript. Finally, a defendant is
usually under an express statutory' requirement to provide a transcript as a
part of the normal record on appeal. With its assistance, the appellate court
can better determine the merits of defendant's contentions. On occasion, the
judgment of a lower court has been reversed solely on the basis of error which
has appeared in the record but was not submitted for argument by counsel.2
The Constitutional Requirements
To an indigent defendant, -the cost of a transcript may be an insurmountable
obstacle in his path to appellate review. Procuring a transcript could entail an
average expenditure of forty-five dollars per hour of trial.8 In the much-noted4
case of Griffin v. Illinois,5 the United States Supreme Court considered the
effect of this financial impediment to an indigent felon's appeal. Indigent code-
fendants, Griffin and Crenshaw, convicted of armed robbery, requested a free
transcript of their trial in order to prosecute an appeal. Although counsel for
the state conceded that petitioners needed a transcript to receive adequate
appellate review, the Illinois Supreme Court denied that they were constitution-
1 In California, on an appeal from a superior court, a criminal defendant must
provide a reporter's transcript of the trial proceedings as part of the normal appellate
record. CAL. R. CT. 33, 35. In an appeal from a municipal or justice court to a superior
court, he must normally provide either a reporters transcript (CAL. R. CT. 184) or a
settled statement of the evidence (CAL. R. CT. 187).2 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 673 nn. 5, 6 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
O'Neil v. Jones, 185 Tenn. 539, 206 S.W.2d 782 (1947); State v. Apodaca, 42 N.M.
544, 82 P.2d 641 (1938).
a A transcript costs 175 dollars for the average municipal court trial. Interview with
Margory E. Boiler, Official Court Reporter, Hall of Justice, San Francisco, Aug. 6, 1965.4 E.g., Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 143 (1957); Wilcox and Blou-
stein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 ConNrm. L.Q. 1
(1957); Notes, 55 Micr L. REv. 413 (1957); 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 350 (1957); 4
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 274 (1957); Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1957).
5351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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ally entitled to one. The United States Supreme Court vacated this judgment,
the opinion stating, 'There can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants
must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts."
This application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires that an indigent appellant be furnished with a free transcript when-
ever a state guarantees a right to appellate review, and a transcript is necessary
to secure this right.7 This does not suggest that an indigent defendant has an
absolute right to a free transcript. It means only that he has a right to equal
protection under the laws of the state. Such protection may not require the
furnishing of a reporter's transcript, as Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, carefully qualified: "The Supreme Court [of Illinois] may find other
means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent de-
fendants."8 Nor is a state under a strict duty to meet the requirements of Griffin
where it is presently impossible, and defendant, having had counsel at the
time of the trial, failed to pursue an appeal.9
Constitutional Right of the Misdemeanant
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the applica-
tion of the equal protection clause formulated in Griffin is constitutionally re-
quired in the case of an indigent misdemeanant. On the other hand, the majority
in Griffin did not limit their discussion to "felons"; instead, they talked only of
indigent "defendants" and "petitioners." It is submitted that the nebulous, in-
consistent line between misdemeanors and felonies' ° is too arbitrary" a criterion
for determining who is entitled to a free transcript. This discrimination could
Old. at 19.
' Norvel v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963); Preston v. Municipal Court, 188 Cal. App.
2d 76, 10 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1961).
As a logical consequence of Griffin, it was held in Eskridge v. Washington Prison
Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958), that a trial court does not have discretion to deny a motion
for a free transcript by an indigent defendant on the basis of its opinion that defendant
was afforded a fair and impartial trial. "The conclusion of the trial judge that there was
no reversible error in the trial cannot be an adequate substitute for the right to full
appellate review available to all defendants in Washington who can afford the expense of
transcript." Id. at 216. Accord, Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
8351 U.S. at 20. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963); Eskridge v.
Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958); Preston v. Municipal Court, 188 CaL
App. 2d 76, 86, 10 Cal. Rptr. 301, 306 (1961).
9 Norvel v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963) (reporter dead, twenty-year-old trial notes
not transcribable).
Mr. Justice Goldberg vigorously dissented. He felt the issue was not the present
impossibility of providing a transcript, but the retroactivity of Griffin. "[Pletitioner...
in 1941 because of his indigency, was at that time deprived of his constitutional rights.
... Griffin was a constitutional decision vindicating basic Fourteenth Amendment rights
and is no more to be restricted in scope or application in time than other constitutional
judgments." Id. at 425. Accord, Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
10 "A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in a
state prison. Every other crime is a misdemeanor." CAL. PF.M. CODE § 17.
" See Packer, The Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAr. L. RBv. 2.52
(1961). Although Mr. Packer does not discuss the right to free transcript, he does
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result in such patently absurd situations as an indigent felon securing relief from a
judgment of probation, while a misdemeanant spends a year or more 2 in the
county jail because he could not afford the cost of a transcript. Any meaningful
difference between misdemeanors and felonies is further eroded by the fact that
in certain instances, under California Penal Code section 1203.4, a convicted felon
may be relieved of all collateral penalties and disabilities, such as loss of the right
to vote.13 It would seem incongruous to base denial of a right to full appellate
review on such an insubstantial distinction between the two classes of crime. So
far it appears that this view has found judicial expression only in California. 14 In
Preston v. Municipal Court,15 after discussing Griffin, Justice Tobriner said:
"While there are many obvious differences between the misdemeanor and the
felony, and the former, of course, imposes a lighter penalty, we do not believe the
difference justifies the mutilation of the right of appeal by deprivation of the
transcript."16 Hence, Preston makes it clear that an indigent defendant's right to a
free transcript does not depend on the classification of his crime. Similarly, it would
seem inconsistent with Preston to limit this right to particular courts. The indigent
defendant should be allowed a free transcript regardless of whether he is tried in a
superior, municipal, or justice court.
As in Griffin, the application of Preston is limited to instances in which alter-
native means of prosecuting an appeal are inadequate. Hence, on appeal, the
indigent misdemeanant must utilize a settled statement of the evidence whenever
it would be sufficient to present the alleged errors.' 7
Statutes
Notwithstanding the constitutional ramifications, the right to a free transcript
is largely governed by statute. Even at the time of Griffin many states,' 8 and the
federal government, 19 had legislation on the subject.
review other collateral effects of classifying a crime. "It is questionable whether the
legislature, in prescribing whether a given offense shall be a felony or a misdemeanor,
reaches a conclusion after evaluating all the collateral consequences of the classification.
It is even more questionable whether the same considerations would be thought to apply
to each of the varied consequences.... In short, the factors governing a determination as
to these 'collateral consequences' need to be faced separately, with respect to each such
consequence." Id. at 257.
12 CAL. PEN. CODE § 19(a) provides that the maximum imprisonment for a mis-
demeanor shall not exceed one year in a county jail. But there is theoretically no limit to
the number of consecutive one-year sentences which may be imposed on a single defend-
ant at one trial for the commission of several misdemeanors.
l Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638 (1953).
'4 In re Henderson, 61 Cal. 2d 541, 39 Cal. Rptr. 373, 393 P.2d 685 (1964); Preston
v. Municipal Court, 188 Cal. App. 2d 76, 10 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1961).
v. 188 Cal. App. 2d 76, 10 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1961).
1 Id. at 85, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
17 Before he is entitled to a free transcript the indigent defendant must flfill two
procedural obligations. First, he must make a bona fide attempt to procure a settled
statement. Green v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 2d 484, 12 Cal. ptr. 796 (1961).
Second, in consideration of an expedient appellate system, he should allege his indigeny
at the time of his request. In re Henderson, 61 Cal. 2d 541, 39 Cal. ptr. 373, 393 P.2d
685 (1964).
68 See, e.g., N.Y. CODE C(6. P)oc. § 456; WAs. Rrv. CODE, § 2.32.240 (1951).
192,8 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
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Federal
In federal courts the indigent appellant is entitled to a free appeal as well as a
free transcript.20 However, before he is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, he
must secure the trial court's certification that his appeal is taken in "good faith."21
This is determined by an objective standard: the issues raised by the indigent
appellant -must not be so frivolous that if raised by a nonindigent, the appeal
would be dismissed as being without merit.22
If defendant's request to proceed in forma pauperis is denied, he is entitled to
a "record of sufficient completeness to enable him to attempt to make a showing
that the District Court's certificate of lack of 'good faith' is in error ... ,,23 But
Ingram v. United States24 requires that he first make "some showing of error,
[even] if only vague and conclusory .... s2 5 This would seem to be properly
interpreted as an attempt to prohibit the use of free transcripts for discovery
purposes. Counsel may well argue that he needs a transcript for careful study to
determine adequately what constitutes prejudicial error. However, it is difficult to
conceive of actual error existing and any trial counsel's being unable to make the
minimal showing required by Ingram. Nor, in such circumstances, has a court
held that due process requires furnishing an indigent defendant with a free
transcript for discovery purposes.26 The Ingram limitation is desirable, since un-
necessary government expenditures are avoided by dissuading appellate review
based upon mere suspicion or hope of error. However, when new counsel repre-
sents an indigent defendant on direct appeal, a general need for a transcript is
apparent.27 This does not apply to the defendant himself, seeking to attack the
judgment collaterally and desiring a free transcript for his own perusal.28
2028 U.S.C. § 753 (1964) (Court Reporter Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964) (Pro-
ceedings in Forma Pauperis).
21 Ibid. See Young v. United States, 246 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1957); United States
v. Gicinto, 114 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
2 2 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1961). Where, under the policy of a
particular Circuit Court of Appeals, a nonindigent is entitled to hearing of oral argu-
ments on an adverse ruling when his appeal is screened for frivolity, an indigent must be
allowed the same privilege before a district court's certification of bad faith, based on
its finding of frivolity, is conclusive. United States v. Deaton, 349 F.2d 664 (6th Cir.
1965).
28 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1961).
24315 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
25 Id. at 31.
2 6 If due process required the availability of a transcript to a defendant for discovery
purposes, equal protection would seem to require allowing an indigent the same right
at county expense. The financial implications are painfully obvious. A county would be
burdened with the immense cost of furnishing all indigents with transcripts of their
trials, even though many of them would never pursue an appeal.
27 Hardy v. United States, 385 U.S. 277 (1964).
2 8 In United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964), defendant alleged in
good faith that he believed there was error in the record. The court pointed out that this
was not sufficient. Many errors which may be reviewed on direct appeal are not subject
to review on collateral attack, since the usual basis for collateral attack arises from matters
outside the trial. Furthermore, there is doubt whether a defendant could recognize as
error that which he and his trial counsel did not think prejudicial at the time of the trial.
However, the court suggested that if defendant filed a petition showing some nonfrivolous
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California
California has gone well beyond the scope of Griffin in its statutory scheme
by providing free transcripts to nonindigent, as well as indigent felons. By 1909
the felon was given an express statutory right to a transcript at county expense.29
This right has been reiterated in subsequent decisions,30 and is protected today by
California Government Code section 69952, which enables the trial court to
order a free transcript, and California Rules of Court, Rules 33 and 35, which
eliminate the court's discretion in criminal cases.3 1 Of course, the unexercised
right to free transcript expires with the time for appeal.
32
There is no manifested legislative intent to provide a misdemeanant with a
free transcript on appeal. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 274c, which
describes the duties bf reporters in municipal courts, the trial judge may require
the reporting and transcribing of the proceedings;3 3 however, it is entirely within
ground for collateral attack, a transcript of the trial would be provided to the extent it
was relevant to the issues raised. See also United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200 (4th Cir.
1963).
29 Cal. Stat. 1909, ch. 710, § 1, at 1084 (repealed, Cal. Stat. 1927, ch. 620,
§§ 4-8, at 1048; noW incorporated in CAL. R. CT. 30-38). This section was enacted
after Richards v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. 38, 78 Pac. 244 (1904), interpreted Code of
Civil Procedure section 274 (repealed, Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 206, § 7, at 1342; now
incorporated in CAL. Cov'T CODE §§ 69947-69953) as permitting the trial judge to
determine when a felon is entitled to a free transcript. Cal. Stat. 1909, ch. 710, § 1, at
1084, eliminated the court's discretion as to felons.
0 People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 2d 449, 211 P.2d 561 (1949); In re Paiva, 31 Cal. 2d
503, 190 P.2d 604 (1948).31 In particular, CAL. R. CT. 33(b) (3): "[Tlhe judge, within 5 days after the filing
of such application, [for inclusions in the transcript] shall make an order directing the
inclusion in the record of as much of the additional material as, in his opinion, may be
proper to present fairly and fully the points relied on by the appellant in his application.
If the judge fails to make any order within five days after the application is filed, the
material requested, with the exception of exhibits, shall be included in the clerk's
and reporters transcript without such order." (Emphasis added.) CAL. R. CT. 35(b):
"Where a reporters transcript is required, the clerk immediately, on the filing of the
notice of appeal, shall notify the reporter... He shall deliver the original and all copies
to the clerk immediately on their completion, and in no case more than 20 days after
the filing of the notice of appeal unless such time is extended as provided in subsection
(d) of this rule." (Emphasis added.)
82 People v. Tucker, 61 Cal. 2d 828, 40 Cal. Rptr. 609, 395 P.2d 499 (1964)
(dictum); People v. Sparks, 112 Cal. App. 2d 120, 246 P.2d 64 (1952).
83 A misdemeanant may have difficulty in obtaining a transcript. In many of the
smaller counties there is no official reporter assigned to a municipal court. It is possible
to have a reporter pro tempore in such cases, since a reporter may be "borrowed" from the
county superior court. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 72196. The requesting party would apparently
be required to pay for both the reporting and transcribing. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 69947.
The reporting fee is $35 per day, CAL. Gov'r CODE § 69948, and the transcription fee
is $.35 per 100 words, CAL. Gov'T CODE: § 69950. Most of the larger counties routinely
provide reporters for a municipal court under statutory requirements. The reporting is
done at county expense, and the defendant pays only for what he requests transcribed.
E.g., CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 74511, 74514 (San Francisco County); § 73342 (Contra
Costa County); § 72709 (Los Angeles County).
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the court's discretion whether this be done at county expense.34 Despite any
statutory references to Government Code section 69952,35 a misdemeanant in a
municipal court 6 is without its advantages, since that section expressly operates
A defendant tried in a small county may be unable to have the proceedings re-
ported. Although, under CAL. CODE Crv. PnoC. § 269, counsel in a superior court may
directly order the reporting done, § 274c, governing municipal court reporters, provides
that in criminal proceedings only the trial judge shall have this power. See Hidalgo v.
Municipal Court, 129 Cal. App. 2d 244, 277 P.2d 36 (1954). If defendant's motion to
have a reporter present were denied, he could still use a settled statement on appeal.
CAL. R. CT. 127. But because of the length of the trial, the complexity of the
evidence, or the imperfect memory of counsel, a settled statement may not clearly show
the alleged errors. In that event, the defendant would not be able adequately to
present his contentions on appeal. See Preston v. Municipal Court, 188 Cal. App. 2d 76,
10 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1961). If the appellate court found that the trial court abused its
discretion, a new trial might be ordered. But it would seem unfair to require a defend-
ant to undergo a second trial because he was tried in a county which did not provide for
the routine presence of a reporter in its municipal court. Furthermore, a misdemeanant's
right to adequate appellate review should not be subject to the discretion of a trialjudge who may not think that defendant's case merits the effort required to secure a
reporter. There should be a legislative change in CAL. CODE CIV. PNoc. § 274c to allow
counsel the right to order the proceedings reported.
If this be done, there is still the question of an indigent's right to have the reporting
charged to the county. A defendant's right to order the proceedings reported would be
illusory if he could not exercise this power because of financial inability. Although it is
debatable whether the equal protection clause requires that the county bear the cost
of reporting, it would seem that under proper circumstances a transcript would be
necessary for adequate appellate review. In these cases it is within the discretion of
the trial court whether any of the costs under § 274c be charged to the county. Hidalgo
v. Municipal Court, 129 Cal. App. 2d 244, 277 P.2d 36 (1954).
34 County of San Diego v. Milotz, 46 Cal. 2d 761, 300 P.2d 1 (1956) (dictum);
Hidalgo v. Municipal Court, 129 Cal. App. 2d 244, 277 P.2d 66 (1954).
35 Several references are found in the Government Code. E.g., § 72195 provides that
"Government Code sections 69942 to 69953, inclusive . . . are hereby made applicable
to the qualifications, duties .... and fees of official reporters of municipal courts," and
§ 74514 states that "upon order of the court . . . fees for transcription of testimony
and proceedings in criminal cases as provided in sections 69947 to 69953, inclusive
. . . shall be paid from the city and county treasury." Furthermore, CAL. CODE Crv.
Pnoc. § 274c expressly referred to section 69952 until the repeal of that clause by
Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1424, § 1, at 2592.
36 A misdemeanor may be tried in a superior court. The California Constitution
provides for the jurisdiction of a superior court "in all criminal cases amounting to
felony, and cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for." CAL. CONST., art. 6, § 5.
When there is no municipal court in the judicial district, and the misdemeanor is not
within the jurisdiction of the justice court, it must be tried in superior court. See People
v. Zadro, 20 Cal. App. 2d 320, 66 P.2d 1204 (1937) (justice court had no jurisdiction
over misdemeanor).
In such cases, it would seem that the misdemeanant would have the same rights
as a felon. Both CAL. GoV'T CODE § 69952 and CAL. R. CT. 33, 35, apply to criminal
cases in the superior court, not merely to felonies.
Today, a misdemeanant will rarely be tried in a superior court. Formerly, CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1425 limited the jurisdiction of a justice court to misdemeanors for which
the maximum punishment was a 1,000 dollar fine and/or six months in the county jaiL
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pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 269,37 describing the duties of a
superior court reporter. In providing only misdemeanants 8s with the alternative
of using a settled statement on appeal,8 9 the legislature has evinced further intent
to limit the need for a transcript.40
The Procedural Complication of Preston
If a settled statement is inadequate to present the alleged errors, a misdemean-
ant is entitled to a free transcript, but only if he can satisfactorily establish his
indigeney. 41 In announcing this right to free transcript, Preston v. Municipal
Court4 2 has implicitly created a new problem-how shall a municipal court
handle a request for a trial transcript in a case of multiple defendants, only some
of whom are indigent?
The difficulty lies in the fact that all the defendants may utilize the same
transcript on appeal,43 yet only the indigents are entitled to one at county
expense. 44 It would be violative of Preston, and perhaps Griffgin, to deprive the
indigent of this right. Such deprivation could occur if the trial court required the
indigents to use the transcript of the others; for, if the nonindigents failed to
procure one, the indigents could not pursue their appeal.45 Of course, under Code
A recent amendment to that section allows a justice court to try misdemeanors, with
one exception, punishable by a year's imprisonment, thereby extending the court's
jurisdiction to almost all misdemeanors.
3 7 See also People v. Miller, 161 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 842, 327 P.2d 236 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1958); Hidalgo v. Municipal Court, 129 Cal. App. 2d 244,
277 P.2d 36 (1954).
38 In rare cases an appeal from a superior court may be taken by a settled state-
ment of the evidence. It is necessary that the desired part of the oral proceedings be
unobtainable without the fault of the appellant. CAL. R. CT. 4, 36(b).
39 CAL. B. CT. 184.40 Hidalgo v. Municipal Court, 129 Cal. App. 2d 244, 277 P.2d 36 (1954).
41 Unfortunately, there is no standardized test of indigency in California; hence,
criteria will vary from county to county. The United States Supreme Court dictated a
test for indigency sufficient for the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964):
"[Ain affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty 'pay or
give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide' himself and dependents
'with the necessities of life."' Adkins v. Dupont Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). The
Public Defender's office in Alameda County utilizes a similar test, weighing several
factors which include defendant's assets, debts, family, and the cost of private counsel.
Since a misdemeanant usually requires the services of counsel for a shorter time than a
felon, he would have a more difficult time qualifying as an indigent. Such a "fluid
test" does provide a realistic means of establishing indigency, since it entails a full con-
sideration of an individual's financial peculiarities. Telephone interview with Mr. J.
Munes, Public Defender for Alameda County, August 23, 1965.
42 188 Cal. App. 2d 76, 10 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1961).
4 3 CAL. R. CT. 131.
44 This problem does not exist when the multiple defendants are felons, since all
are entitled to free transcript. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 69952; CAL. R. CT. 33, 35; People v.
Smith, 34 Cal. 2d 449, 211 P.2d 561 (1949).
45 See Pearlman v. State, 226 Md. 395, 172 A.2d 395 (1961). Cf. Adkins v. DuPont
Co., 335 U.S. 331, 340 (1948), concerning 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964): "We do not think
that this petitioner can be denied a right of appeal under the statute merely because
other claimants will neither give security for costs nor sign an affidavit of poverty."
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of Civil Procedure section 274c, a free transcript could be provided for al,46 but
an obvious rebuttal would be that financially-able defendants are being allowed an
appeal at county expense. On the other hand, the indigents could be supplied
with a transcript and the nonindigents required to purchase a second copy for
their own use. Either of these two extremes would satisfy Preston, but both place
an unnecessary financial burden on the other party.
A compromise was suggested in the Maryland decision of Pearlman v. State,47
providing that the nonindigents "may not use the [indigents'] transcript in an
appeal... without paying a fair share of its cost."48 Unfortunately, the court was
not precise in detailing what this would be. Defining "fair share,"49 entails the
determination of what is fair and what is practical. It would be fair for an
appellant to pay for the equivalent portion of the transcript which is applicable to
him; that is, the fraction he represents of the total defendants tried. The mathe-
matical simplicity of this technique enables the immediate determination of a
nonindigent's share of the cost. The trial judge would order the reporters notes
transcribed and a copy filed with the clerk of the appellate department of the
superior court. If a nonindigent desired to use the transcript on appeal, he would
pay his "fair share." When the time limit to perfect appeal had expired, the
remainder of the cost would be charged to the county. Thereby, the indigents
would have their free transcript, and the county and nonindigents could share
their mutual expenses.
46 The Alameda County Municipal Court did provide a free weekly transcript to
the 155 defendants in the First Consolidated Trial, Cases C-7468 to C-7543, People v.
Mario Savio (1965), popularly known as the "Berkeley Sit-in Tyials." The trial court,
in exercising its powers under CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 274c was undoubtedly influenced
by the unprecedentedly large number of defendants, the complexity of appeal, and
possibly the complication that some of the defendants would be entitled to a free
transcript as indigents.
This case will present several novel problems on appeal. First, there were about
500 defendants who waived jury trial and submitted themselves to the judgment of the
court based on the trial of the 155, and certain individual stipulations. Since these
defendants were not parties to the First Consolidated Trial, they are not entitled to
utilize the free transcript which was provided. Each one would have to purchase a
separate transcript for appeal. Obviously, this would entail great expense and serve no
practical end other than to meet a statutory requirement. One realistic solution sug-
gested by Mr. D. Jensen, Deputy District Attorney for Alameda County, would be the
utilization of a common technique of property law-incorporation by reference, allow-
ing a defendant to refer back to specified portions of the transcript filed by the parties
to the First Consolidated Trial. Telephone interview, August 26, 1965. The second
problem results from the fact that not all the defendants were sentenced at the same
time. Those who were sentenced later could be required to provide their own transcripts.
Again, Mr. Jensen's suggestion would seem applicable. These defendants could refer to
the pertinent sections of the transcript which was previously filed.
47 226 Md. 67, 172 A.2d 395 (1961).
48 Id. at 76, 172 A.2d at 400.
49 San Francisco Municipal Court Judge R. J. Drewes applied the Pearlman decision
in two rulings, People v. Burbridge, Cases J24263-5, July 12, 1965, amended July 23,
1965, and People v. Hallinan, Cases J24358-61, July 20, 1965, amended August 13,
1965. Judge Drewes ordered a transcript, requiring the nonindigents to pay the differ-
ence between the total cost and the fractional cost, represented by the ratio of indigents
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
Expanding the Right to Free Transcript
The constitutional right of an indigent to a free transcript under Griffin has
not been limited to cases of direct attack on a judgment of conviction. It is well
established that Griffin is applicable to collateral proceedings in state courts.5 0
California has reached the same result through statutory interpretation. Since
In re Paiva,51 the right to free transcript has included hearings on writs of error
coram nobis.52
The right to free transcript is not restricted to collateral proceedings. A right
to a transcript of a prior mistrial was established in People v. Hollander.5s
Hollander gave a month's notice to have a transcript prepared, in order to impeach
the people's witnesses at his second trial. At the time of his request Hollander was
represented by counsel, but he had defended himself at the first trial.. On appeal,
the trial court's refusal to have a transcript prepared was found sufficiently
prejudicial to merit reversal. Subsequent decisions have clearly defined this right
to a transcript of a prior trial. Hollander has been held applicable only if there
was timely notice to prepare a transcript,54 new counsel in the second trial,5r a
need for impeaching witnesses,5 6 and a necessary, prejudicial failure in this
endeavor.57
Despite this seemingly conservative application of Government Code section
69952 in the intermediate courts, the California Supreme Court has liberally
extended its scope. In Gross v. Superior Court,58 it decided that a defendant in a
sexual psychopathy proceeding is entitled to a free transcript on appeal. The
majority disposed of Justice Edmonds' dissenting argument that the proceeding
was a civil action,59 and the opening requirements of section 69952 ("In criminal
cases.. ."), by stating, "The proceeding is not strictly a criminal case... yet it is
to be noted it has some of the features pertinent to such cases. The state is
defendant's opponent."60 In 1965, the Supreme Court, reaffirmed Gross in People
v. Victor,6 1 Justice Schauer stating, "similar considerations obtain here and lead
to total defendants at the trial. The remainder of the cost was charged to the county.
Although offering, apparently, the first California solution to the problem, Judge Drewes'
method of fixing costs makes it difficult to determine the exact expense to one appellant
because of uncertainty as to how many other nonindigents will pursue appeals.
50 E.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (coram nobis hearing); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for writ of habeas corpus); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1958) (filing fee before filing motion for leave to appeal).
5131 Cal. 2d 503, 190 P.2d 604 (1948).
52 People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993 (1965);
People v. Sparks, 112 Cal. App. 2d 120, 246 P.2d 64 (1952).
58 194 Cal. App. 2d 386, 14 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1961).
54 People v. Sullivan, 206 Cal. App. 2d 36, 23 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1962).
55 People v. Berry, 199 Cal. App. 2d 97, 18 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1962).
56 Ibid.
5 7 See People v. Goodloe, 225 Cal. App. 2d 686, 37 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1964).
58 42 Cal. 2d 816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954).
59 "All the decisions which determine the nature of a proceeding under the sexual
psychopathy laws hold that it is of a civil nature .... Unless and until those decisions
are overruled the present appeal is not 'in a criminal case."' Id. at 821, 270 P.2d at 1028.
6o Id. at 821, 270 P.2d at 1027.
61 62 Cal. 2d 280, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391 (1965).
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us to the same conclusion, i.e., that persons involuntarily committed to the custody
of the Director of Corrections under this program [narcotic rehabilitation] have a
right to free transcript on appeal from the order of commitment."6 2
Conclusions
The apparent delimitation of Hollander and the liberality of the Supreme Court
in Gross and Victor may be reconciled if one factor is emphasized-had their
appeals failed, both Victor and Gross would have been committed to state hospitals
against their will.6s They would have been as substantially deprived of their liberty
as any criminal. 64 In refusing to apply Hollander, the district courts of appeal
repeatedly emphasized the need for a defendant to show that he was prejudiced
by the lack of a transcript.6 5 It is obvious that the courts do not want transcripts
supplied for discovery purposes.66 Therefore, particular circumstances, as in
Hollander, are necessary to show an actual need for a transcript. Hence, these
decisions do not differ in law or basic philosophy, but rather in the degree to which
a transcript was essential to safeguard defendant's liberty.
The protection of liberty necessarily involves the concept of due process. The
requisite due process to deprive one of his liberty is not subject to exact measure-
ment, but is rather a fluid concept capable of proper definition only within the
context of present social values. Undeniably, in today's society, with its increased
awareness of civil rights and equal opportunity, the procedural requirements of
due process will become more stringent. This is obvious in the recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois67 and the California
Supreme Court in People v. Dorado.68
As the concept of due process expands, so must the right to free transcript.
62 Id. at 288-89, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 203, 398 P.2d at 395-96.
63 Gross faced commitment to Mendicino State Hospital as a sexual psychopath;
Victor would have been confined in the medical facility at Vacaville, California as
a narcotic addict.
4 "His liberty is at stake. Since those things are matters pertaining to the pro-
tection and rights of a person similar to one involved in a criminal case we believe he
falls within the terms of section 69952 of the Government Code... Gross v. Superior
Court, 42 Cal. 2d 816, 821, 270 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1954).65 People v. Sullivan, 206 Cal. App. 2d 36, 23 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1962); People v.
Berry, 199 Cal. App. 2d 97, 18 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1962).
66People v. Goodloe, 225 Cal. App. 2d 686, 37 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1964). "This
motion may be regarded as in the nature of a discovery proceeding. The discovery
cases, however, do not appear to look with favor on such unsupported requests. They
indicate that a defendant must show some better cause for inspection than the mere
desire for the benefit of all information obtained by the People." Id. at 688, 37 Cal.
Rptr. at 591.
67378 U.S. 478 (1964). Defendant had been taken into police custody and was
subjected to interrogation. Because he was refused opportunity to consult with counsel,
and not warned of his constitutional right to remain silent, his statements made during
investigation were held inadiiissible at his trial.
68 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937
(1965). The California court here interpreted Escobedo as requiring that police, when in-
terrogating a suspect in custody upon whom an investigation has focused, advise him of
his right to counsel and to remain silent. Statements made by him in response to
interrogation after failure to give such advice are inadmissible.
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However, it would seem improper to attempt any substantial delineation of this
right. Except where a defendant has a statutory or constitutional guarantee, the
propriety of supplying a free transcript should be a matter of judicial discretion.
For it is the trial judge who is best qualified to weigh, in a particular case, the de-
termining factors of social demands, threatened loss to the defendant, practical
benefit of a transcript, and cost to the county.
Insofar as the California courts can maintain their social responsiveness, the
present law is adequate. But in this sense, the limitation of Government Code
sections 69952 and 69953, allowing a free transcript only in criminal cases, is
undesirable. Under section 69952, the Supreme Court has stretched the meaning
of "criminal cases" to include sexual psychopathy hearings, 69 and narcotic re-
habilitation commitment proceedings. 7o It is uncertain how much farther this
section can be judicially extended.
Therefore, a legislative change in section 69952 is needed. This section should
be altered to enable a superior court judge to order a free transcript when, in his
discretion, it is necessary and proper. Section 69953,71 which places the cost of a
transcript solely on the parties to a civil action, should be modified to the extent
necessary to recognize the court's discretionary power.
In essence, these changes will open the door in California to a right to free
transcript in civil actions."2 It is true that rights of property are distinguishable
from rights of liberty,73 but this does not mean that they are less significant to an
individual. Furthermore, it would seem arbitrary to draw a line between liberty
and property, for the two are separated by a continuous spectrum of ambivalent
rights. Hence, consideration must be given to "quasi-criminal" rights, such as those
involved in psycopathy hearings; civil liberties, such as free speech, suffrage and
religious rights; and near the other end of the gamut, "quasi-property" rights, such
as privacy.74 Therefore, it does not seem that an exact demarcation of a right to
free transcript is feasible. Today, an indigent in California can lose his property
and civil liberties because he cannot afford a transcript, but if he breaks a criminal
69 Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954).
70 People v. Victor, 62 Cal. 2d 280, 42 Cal. Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 392 (1965).
71 It is this section which prevents a municipal court judge from ordering a free
transcript in civil cases under CAL. CODE Cry. Pnoc. § 274c.
72 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964) which allows a federal trial court to charge
the cost of a transcript in civil, as well as criminal, cases to the United States. This may
be done if the court finds that the appeal is taken in "good faith." N.Y. Civ. PnAc. LAw
§ 1102(b) entitles indigent appellants in a civil action to a copy of the transcript at
county expense. See People v. Politano, 32 Misc. 2d 530, 223 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Montgomery
Co. Ct. 1962).
73 In Preston v. Municipal Court, 188 Cal. App. 2d 76, 10 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1961),
the court curtailed any discussion of a right to free transcript in civil cases by stating
"[W]e may properly differentiate between loss of property in civil actions and loss of
liberty by incarceration for the commission of crime." Id. at 84, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
The fact that one may distinguish between the two is no basis, in itself, for denying a
necessary transcript to an indigent appellant in a civil action.
74 "Very often protection of the right of privacy involves the protection of property
interests as well as the purely personal interests, but that fact is not much stressed by
the courts. If they seek a property interest, it is rather as a technical basis for allowing
protection to the personal interest than as a substantial economic interest to be pro-
tected on its own account." McCrx;Trcoc, EQurrY 432 (2d ed. 1948).
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